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As an introduction to this issue of The Second Draft, I address some FAQ’s about the role 
of narrative (as below defined) in law and in life.  I hope these brief FAQ’s might also double as 
a workable handout for teachers first introducing students to the importance of narrative in law 
and in life. 
Why should we study narrative? 
I use the term “narrative” broadly as “a story.”1  Deriving from the Latin, historia, the 
story is “[a]n account or a recital of an event or series of events.”2  Since we are temporal beings 
whose lives play out as series of events (mental and physical), we by definition unfold as stories. 
If we are to understand ourselves and others, we must therefore understand the nature, 
opportunities, and limits of narrative.   
These limits include inherited forms of narrative that restrict us where we do not push 
back. As Alasdair MacIntyre puts it: 
We enter human society . . . with one or more imputed characters—roles into which we 
have been drafted—and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand 
how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construed. . . . 
Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their 
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actions as in their words.  Hence there is no way to give us an understanding of any 
society, including our own, except through the stock of stories which constitute its initial 
dramatic resources.
3
 
We must thus grasp narrative for self-understanding, for understanding others, and for 
understanding how others view us and those depending upon us. Where current or inherited 
stories fail us or those depending upon us, we must understand how to tell better stories with 
equal or greater plausibility. 
Does narrative have a basic overarching form or forms? 
Yes. Since a story is “[a]n account or a recital of an event or series of events,”4 a story’s 
most basic form is perhaps just the recounting of some person or thing (or some persons or 
things) moving from any point (or number of points) to another point (or number of points) in 
time.  This basic form allows infinite permutations and lawyers need the best of these forms for 
their purposes.   
Amsterdam and Bruner give us one powerful candidate for best plotting such narrative 
movement: a five-part structure involving (1) an “initial steady state,” (2) a “Trouble” that 
disrupts the initial steady state, (3) “. . . efforts at redress or transformation, which succeed or 
fail,” (4) “. . . [an] old steady state . . . restored or a new (transformed) steady state . . . created,” 
and (5) possibly a concluding “moral of the story.”5   
This five-part structure seems particularly useful for lawyers because our clients come to 
us with problems needing solution.  We need to understand the state preceding the problem, the 
trouble that caused the problem, the desired new “steady state,” and the best means to the end of 
achieving that new “steady state.”  Understanding the “moral” of the “tale” is also important.  If 
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the matter is a transactional one, we need to understand what is right for the parties so that we 
construct a win-win deal if that is at all possible.  If the matter is one of litigation, we want to 
understand and articulate the justice of our client’s position to increase the chance that we 
prevail.   
How does framing drive narrative? 
In constructing the “moral” of our tale as well as discerning the best means to achieve the 
desired new “steady state,” we must understand the role and flexibility of framing in narrative.  
In any such understanding, we can often plausibly reject inherited or opposition frames.  Of 
course, to understand this, we also must take care to be conscious of the frames in play.  
To illustrate, we might take Wittgenstein’s famous example of a drawing that on its face 
can just as plausibly picture a duck or a rabbit.
6
  If we represent a client whose duck was stolen 
(the “Trouble”) and believe that a similar picture is actually a drawing of the duck made by the 
thief, we will want to frame the drawing as one of a duck.  If we step into a courtroom where 
everyone is speaking of a rabbit drawing, we will of course want to push back.  Our opponents 
may have framed first but we can reframe and resist. 
How do concepts drive narrative? 
To talk about someone’s or something’s journey through time, we must be able to clearly 
refer to them.  Without getting into the philosophical weeds about how we do this, we can, 
among other ways, name them, use contextually-clear pronouns, or describe them.
7
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For example, if I want my story to be about George Washington and not Thomas 
Jefferson, I can use Washington’s name or I can use some descriptive term or phrase such as “the 
first President of the United States.”  To do the latter, to describe persons or things, I need 
descriptive categories that can single out such persons or things.   
As Amsterdam and Bruner note, “To put something in a category is to assign it meaning, 
to place it in a particular context of ideas.”8  As the second part of this quotation indicates, 
categories bring with them their “context of ideas” and the careful storyteller is conscious of, and 
careful to understand, this broader context and the various ways such context may be framed.  A 
female judge, for example, once responded to a recusal motion in a case of gender discrimination 
that all judges have gender.
9
  
What can we do when we lack the necessary concepts for the narrative we need to tell? 
When we lack concepts that specifically apply to a given situation, we must either create 
new concepts or “stretch” the ones that we have.  To “stretch” a concept, we can use analogy or 
simile (X is like Y) or we can use metaphor (X is Y).
10
   
For example, to tell stories from our laboratory we might view atoms as little solar 
systems where electrons are planets that revolve around a nucleus of protons and neutrons.  In so 
doing, we will be focusing on the similarities between the two parts of the equation and ignoring 
the dissimilarities.   
Of course, good lawyers ignore nothing of potential relevance and will always be 
cognizant of both suppressed dissimilarities and of problematic implications of metaphors 
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chosen.  A solar-system atom, for example, might imply that neutrons and protons are hot while 
electrons are colder like planets.  It might also imply that electrons are solid and particulate like 
planets.  The metaphor presumably ignores such things as moons of planets, comets and other 
things within solar systems.  This may ultimately work or it may not depending on how close the 
correlations must be for purposes of the narrative.   
Interestingly, despite all the admonitions of our English teachers, there are times when 
metaphors should be mixed.  Staying with laboratory examples, quantum mechanics tells us that 
light can be explained as both a particle and a wave.
11
  Of course light is not a particle (at least in 
the sense of the dust particles that traverse its beams) nor is it a wave (at least in the sense of 
waves that wash the beach under its beams).  A fortiori is it therefore not a combination of these 
contradictory things.  Yet, just such a mixed metaphor can be required for good science.
12
  
Are there basic storylines that repeat? 
Yes.  Ruth Anne Robbins, Steve Johansen, and Ken Chestek provide seven good 
examples:  (1) a person against herself, (2) a person against another person, (3) a person against 
society (or the reverse), (4) a person against a machine or institution, (5) a person against nature, 
(6) a person against God, and (7) God against persons.
13
  Though I do not claim this list exhausts 
the basic possibilities, knowing these seven basic types helps lawyers invent compelling 
narratives. 
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Are there basic character types that we reuse? 
Yes.  We no doubt reuse various prominent character types in narrative.  These include 
such archetypes as Hero, God, Savior, Creator, Self, Father, Mother (including Earth Mother, 
Nurturing Mother, Devouring Mother), Child (including Divine Child, Eternal Child), Explorer, 
Wanderer, Outlaw, Monster, Devil, Scapegoat, Victim, Sage, Fool (including Wise Fool), 
Trickster, Tyrant, and Warrior.
 14
  One character may exhibit one or more of these archetypes.  
For example, an Eternal Child could also be a Wanderer and a Trickster.   
Additionally, literature shows common traits that reappear in stock characters.  
Theophrastus, for example, long ago listed the following such traits:  
Dissembling, Flattery, Idle Chatter, Boorishness, Obsequiousness, Shamelessness, 
Garrulity, Rumor-Mongering, Sponging, Pennypinching, Obnoxiousness, Bad Timing, 
Overzealousness, Absent-mindedness, Grouchiness, Superstition, Griping, Mistrust, 
Squalor, Bad Taste, Petty Ambition, Lack of Generosity, Fraudulence, Arrogance, 
Cowardice, Authoritarianism, Rejuvenation, Slander, Patronage of Scoundrels, [and] 
Chiseling.
15
 
Though I do not claim that these lists exhaust the basic possibilities, knowing them also helps 
lawyers invent compelling narratives. 
Can narrative drive the results of a Supreme Court case? 
Yes! Linda Edwards give us a good example with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
16
 In this case, a 
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then in U.S. military jails.  As Linda Edwards puts it, “The administration did not disclose its 
allegations against him, and he had no opportunity to refute them.  The government argued that 
because the United States was under attack by terrorist forces, it could keep Hamdi . . . . 
essentially for as long as it chose.”17   
As Prof. Edwards deftly maintains, the case turned on competing narratives: the “myth of 
redemptive violence” where the executive branch needed a “virtually free hand” to protect us 
from a world described as “an overwhelmingly dangerous place”18 vs. the story of “the hard-won 
freedoms secured [for American citizens] by the American Revolution and the founding of the 
Nation.”19   
As Prof. Edwards notes, the Supreme Court found the “hard-won freedoms” narrative 
more compelling and ruled that Hamdi could not be indefinitely detained without a trial.  In 
doing so, “[t]he majority of the Supreme Court saw the arguments primarily through the lens of 
the American story establishing the liberty and safety of citizens as against an unconstrained 
Executive.”20   
As Prof. Edwards also notes, examining such narratives allows us to ask questions of 
great importance.  It allows us to question such things as whether revenge can really heal us, 
whether following the rule of law really weakens us, and whether violence is “the only effective 
answer to human evil.”21 
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Can narrative drive transactional practice? 
Yes!  As in litigation, parties who construct the better narratives increase their chances of 
prevailing in their negotiations.  In negotiations, good narratives account for the interests of all 
the parties and, if possible, show how the story teller’s desired results achieve a new “steady 
state” that is a win-win for all.   
Additionally, basic contract form permits documentation of these narratives for future 
readers, interpreters, and enforcers of contracts.  Recitals allow parties to tell their transactional 
story and a good lawyer does not waste the story-telling opportunities recitals provide.  In the 
event future disputes arise, the recitals stand ready to tell their story again. 
Finally, how does narrative’s importance underscore  
the importance of an education in the humanities? 
 
As the above answers show, the more stories and character types that one knows, the 
more ammunition one has to be a lawyer.  Lawyers with such knowledge start well ahead of 
lawyers who lack it.   
For what it is worth, I would advise the lawyer lacking a liberal arts background to begin 
with the complete Shakespeare.  As Jane Austen notes:  
[Shakespeare’s] celebrated passages are quoted by everybody; they are in half the  
books we open, and we all talk Shakespeare, use his similes, and describe with his 
descriptions . . . .
22
 
In Shakespeare one finds a plethora of the personality and quandary types one faces over the 
years.  The older I become and the more I see, the more I appreciate the incredible scope of 
Shakespeare’s genius. A lawyer who has never met Falstaff or Prince Hal or the rest of 
Shakespeare’s universe is surely at a disadvantage to the lawyer who has.   
                                                 
22
 1 JANE AUSTEN, Mansfield Park, in THE COMPLETE NOVELS OF JANE AUSTEN 553, 797 
(Modern Library 1992). 
9 
 
That is not to say that lawyers can dispense with other works.  I of course greatly value 
my marked-up volumes of Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Virgil, Chaucer, Dante, 
Villon, Du Bellay, Racine, Molière, Marlowe, Milton, Fielding, Hawthorn, Melville, George 
Eliot, Jane Austen, Hardy, Balzac, Poe, Borges, and Faulkner just to name a few.
23
    As one who 
appreciates the importance of literature in life and in practice, I am thrilled to hear others’ 
thoughts on these volumes and on the countless works that I have unfortunately missed in my 
own studies (including non-Western works neglected in Western canons).  
With these introductory thoughts, I now commend the articles and essays that follow in 
this issue of The Second Draft. 
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